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The paper examines two ubiquitous concepts of power: the “classical sociological” 
concept which draws on Max Weber’s definition of power, and the “Foucauldian” 
concept which stems from Michel Foucault’s genealogical works. Three main the-
ses are argued for. First, the two concepts are not, in most respects, as radically 
different as it is usually claimed. It is demonstrated that both can make room for 
different sources of power, for understanding power in a non-reified way, for the 
fact that power is rarely completely centralised, etc. Second, in those respects in 
which the two concepts actually differ, the classical view of power is more convinc-
ing and useful than the Foucauldian one. It is demonstrated that the Foucauldian 
view is implicitly positivist in the normative domain and thus unable to differenti-
ate between power and domination, and that it succumbs to errors of methodo-
logical holism (i.e. undertheorising agency). Third, it is argued that the classical 
sociological view allows to analytically distinguish between power, domination and 
exploitation. These three categories are shown not to be synonymous and to carry 
with them importantly different sociological implications. It is demonstrated that 
exploitation cannot merely refer to any process of unpaid appropriation of surplus 
as obvious false positives are generated from this definition. Nonetheless, such ap-
propriation is the fundamental characteristic which differentiates exploitation from 
domination (but not power itself), and this reveals an important sociological impli-
cation for the dynamics of struggle of the exploited against exploitation in contrast 
to the struggle of the dominated against the dominators.
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Introduction
The term “power”, usually adjoined by the adjectives “social”, “econom-
ic” or “political”, has for a long time been among the most widely used 
social-scientific concepts. This should not come as a surprise, especially to 
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sociologists, since the “history and theory of power relations [are] likely 
to be virtually synonymous with a history and theory of human society 
itself” (Mann, 1986: 1). Indeed, despite their many disagreements, even 
fundamental ones, sociologists largely agree and have always agreed that, 
as Haugaard and Clegg (2009: 1) recently put it in the Sage Handbook of 
Power, “[t]he concept of power is absolutely central to any understanding 
of society”, since power is, indeed, “chronically and inevitably involved in 
all social processes” (Giddens, 1995: 268).
Even so, the concept of power is a hard nut to crack and many impor-
tant issues regarding power remain unresolved. One reason for this is that 
discussions about that fundamental social phenomenon tend to be plagued 
by vague, unclear, unsystematic or even internally inconsistent definitions 
of power. To give just a few prominent examples, does power always im-
ply domination or should the two be distinguished? Should social scientists 
concern themselves with the normative dimensions of power or should they 
heed Weber’s positivist injunction of value-neutrality? Is power an ability – 
an ability which can remain dormant, unexercised – or can it only exist as 
exercised, actualised? What about the related notion of (economic) exploi-
tation? How is exploitation to be related to power? Is it a subset of power? 
For instance, is exploitation just that exercise of power which involves 
“the separate appropriation of surplus labour” (Therborn, 1980: 9)? This 
classical Marxist definition which has become commonplace in sociology 
is, in fact, seriously lacking as it stands. For one, it implies that all those 
marginalised social groups which receive welfare, i.e. the handicapped, the 
elderly, the poor, are exploiters – after all, they appropriate, without remu-
neration, the surplus labour of the taxpayers. In order not to belabour the 
point any further let me, lastly, observe that even influential and important 
discussions of power tend to define it so abstractly as to make any con-
crete application of the concept specious. For example, Foucault (1978: 
93) somewhat mysteriously announced that power “is the name that one 
attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society”. Such 
definitions of power may sound tantalising but, by themselves, they merely 
rephrase the problem. The question of what power is – what kind of com-
plex strategical situation it represents – remains unanswered.
The main purpose of this paper is, therefore, to clarify as much as 
possible what power is, how it is most usefully conceptualised, and what 
the distinctions are between various forms of power. In the following two 
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sections of the article two influential definitions of power are presented and 
examined. For the sake of convenience these two were named, respectively, 
“classical sociological” and “Foucauldian”. There, the differences between 
power and domination are teased out, and an argument is put forth in de-
fence of making normative statements. At the end of the article the related 
concept of exploitation is examined and an important sociological implica-
tion of distinguishing between nonexploitative domination and exploitation 
is laid bare.
Power and domination: Refining the classical notion
To present what I call the classical sociological concept of power it is use-
ful to begin with Max Weber’s definition.1 I should point out that I will 
not be reconstructing Weber’s own account of power, nor the accounts of 
other classical sociologists, in any detail in this article; I start with Weber’s 
definition simply as a productive way to launch my own discussion. For 
him (Weber, 1978 [1922]: 53) power is, as is well known, “the probability 
that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out 
his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this prob-
ability rests”. This can be, and usually is, further condensed. Social power 
is simply the ability of agent A to influence agent B in such a way (with 
the help of either personal or impersonal means) that agent B does some-
thing he/she otherwise would not have done, or does not do something he/
she otherwise would have done (cf. Dahl, 1961). An everyday example of 
power thusly defined is the power wielded by parents over their children. 
There are at least four important and more concrete points about power that 
should explicitly accompany the abstract definition provided.
First, as should be obvious from both the general definition and the 
concrete example, power is not limited to its exercise. Parents do not always 
exercise the power they have over their children, but they do not thereby 
stop possessing it. Within the classical sociological definition, power should 
1 There are many layers to contemporary debates about power which cannot be discussed 
here in much detail due to limitations of space. One such layer concerns the nature and 
legitimacy of the distinction between two kinds of power (Dowding, 1991). On the one 
hand, power is the ability of an agent to pursue his/her own goals regardless of the ac-
tions of other agents; this is power to. On the other hand, there is power as the ability of 
an agent to steer the actions of other agents; this is power over. For the purposes of this 
article I will not explicitly distinguish between the two, especially since, as Pansardi (2012: 
82) convincingly argued, “although the two concepts do not stand in a relation of perfect 
logical equivalence, they have an extremely high degree of correspondence”.
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be seen as a capacity which can be either activated or remain latent, just as 
a sports car possesses the capacity to travel at 250 km/h even in the case 
when it is actually never driven at that speed.
Second, the means or sources of power are manifold. With the cat-
egory of impersonal means of power I refer particularly to the vulnerable 
structural position of an agent over whom power can come to be exercised. 
Such structural vulnerability exists, for example, when access to the means 
of production and/or subsistence is unequally distributed so that there are 
those who are dispossessed. These property-less agents are in a vulner-
able structural position in relation to those who have a smaller or larger 
monopoly over property because the latter can, owing to their privileged 
structural position, make the former an offer they cannot refuse. In other 
words, the property-less have to curry favour with the property-holders if 
they are to make a living which gives the latter the upper hand. With the 
category of personal sources of power I have in mind any threat of violence 
or the actual use of violence, whether this violence is physical in nature 
or not. Personal means of power also encompass juridical and economic 
sanctions (financial penalties, jail time or prison, loss of employment, sal-
ary reductions, etc.), or threats thereof, inequalities of status, manipulation, 
agenda-setting, more general threats of revoking privileges, promises of 
benefits and so on.
Third, the exercise of power need not be in conflict with the interests 
of the affected agent. Lukes (2005 [1974]: 30) defined power too narrowly 
when he claimed in 1974 that “A exercises power over B when A affects 
B in a manner contrary to B’s interests”. In fact, power is not necessarily 
negative – it can be, but it need not be. What Lukes’ original definition 
actually points to is domination, not power, which he recognised in the in-
troduction to the second edition of his 1974 book (Lukes, 2005 [1974]: 12). 
Domination is, indeed, that form or subset of power which contradicts – I 
should say nontrivially contradicts – the objective interests of the affected 
agent (on this see also Arnold and Harris, 2017). In order to illustrate the 
point, we can continue with the example of the power relationship between 
parents and children. When a parent exercises his or her power over the 
child by denying the child primary education, the parent hurts the objective 
interests of the child. The child is being dominated. The parent’s power 
becomes domination. However, if a parent uses his or her power over the 
child to make the child who has badly broken an arm visit a physician, 
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even though the child refuses to do so, the parent is promoting the child’s 
objective interests. In this case, he or she is still exercising power over the 
child but is not, pace Lukes’ older definition, dominating the child.
Fourth, one of the implications of the second observation above is to 
reveal how variegated power can be. There are many “faces” of power, 
as they have come to be called. There is power as simply (a) the overt 
assertion of will of some agents over others as happens in, for example, 
cases of lobbying for the government (Dahl, 1961). Then there is power 
(b) in a more covert, negative sense as excluding issues or participants 
from the decision-making process as happens when, for example, “barriers 
to the public airing of policy conflicts” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 8) are 
erected. Third, power can also be exercised not simply by overtly or cov-
ertly affecting agents’ action but also by (c) shaping the very subjectivity 
and dispositions of agents. So, power can be exercised by (a) successfully 
imposing someone’s (or some group’s) preferences over the preferences 
of others. Here many preferences are contending to be realised but only 
some get through in the end. Power can also be exercised by (b) making 
the preferences of someone (or some group) invisible. Here the range of 
preferences that are in play is restricted so that their potential assertion is 
neutered from the start. Lastly, power can be exercised by (c) changing the 
preferences of agents (or groups) themselves.
With regards to the third face of power the work of Pierre Bourdieu 
has been very influential, as has Foucault’s, the nature of which will be 
examined in more depth in the next section of the article. According to 
Bourdieu (2001: 37) “symbolic violence” can shape how people perceive 
the world and act in it by triggering their “habitus”. Symbolic violence is 
defined, somewhat mystically, as “a form of power that is exerted on bod-
ies, directly and as if by magic, without any physical constraint” (Bourdieu, 
2001: 37), while habitus is taken to be a system of “durable, transposable 
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring 
structures, that is, as principles which generate and organise practices and 
representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends [...]” (Bourdieu, 1990: 53).
What is crucial is that this process of symbolic violence shaping the 
agent’s subjectivity through his/her habitus, as Bourdieu (2001: 37) noted, 
does not require conscious manipulation neither is it consciously experi-
enced by the subject (see also Bourdieu, 1990: 53). Unfortunately, there 
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are many problems with Bourdieu’s theorisation of habitus so that it is 
more of a necessary starting point for new theories of how power shapes 
the very preferences of subjects, instead of being a fully worked-out the-
ory ready for use. For one, Bourdieu never provided the exact micro-
mechanisms which are ostensibly responsible either for the initial forma-
tion of an agent’s habitus by what he calls a social “field” or its potential 
activation by symbolic violence. Without an at least moderately more fine-
grained explanation of why and how social forces such as fields are able 
to deposit durable dispositions in an agent’s body, or how and why forms 
of violence are able to activate and guide these dispositions, all we have 
is an allusive starting point (Hedström, 2005: 4). Furthermore, and less 
important for the present case, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is liable to 
collapse in a kind of soft socially determinist account, which he other-
wise sought to avoid, whereby an agent’s reflexivity and intentionality 
are neglected, if not wholly effaced. In other words, people’s actions and 
perceptions tend to be seen as completely guided by unconscious habitus, 
itself determined by the social field, in almost all situations. Fortunately, 
there have been attempts, successful in my view, to synthesise Bourdieu’s 
theory of habitus with more explicitly “actionist” theories of subjectivity 
– such as Margaret Archer’s (1995, 2000) social realism – so as to avoid 
either social determinism or individualist voluntarism (see, for example, 
Elder-Vass, 2010b: 87–114).
Before moving on to the Foucauldian view of power, a few potential 
analytical concerns should be addressed relating to the definition of domi-
nation I proposed above, following the later Lukes. It could be asked what 
exactly the qualifier “nontrivially” refers to when I say, refining Lukes’s 
definition, that domination is that form or subset of power which nontrivi-
ally contradicts the objective interests of the affected agent, or how I can 
insist on the category of objective interests after decades of anti-humanist 
critiques of precisely such humanist concepts. Let me take each in turn.
The qualifier “nontrivially” is put in the definition of domination be-
cause almost all forms of power contradict at least one objective interest 
of the affected agent to some extent. Whenever one agent influences the 
actions of another, even in the case of a concerned parent who is forcing 
his/her child to go to the hospital due to a serious injury despite the child’s 
protestations, the short-term autonomy of the affected agent is reduced. 
However, in this case – and many others – it should be clear that the 
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fact that the parent is “violating” the child’s need for autonomy does not 
amount to domination. The child’s need for autonomy is only interfered 
with in a trivial way: it is only denied for a short period of time that is 
required to get to the hospital and take care of the injury, and it is only 
denied because otherwise the child’s bodily autonomy and welfare would 
be fundamentally reduced down the line – not only for a few hours, but for 
a lifetime. Admittedly, the category of “nontriviality” is fuzzy around the 
edges, so it should be settled in each empirical case whether the exercise 
of power only trivially conflicts with the interests of the affected agent or 
not. But the category itself is indispensable for the general definition of 
domination.
As far as the category of objective interests is concerned, it is not 
necessarily empirically ungrounded or analytically suspect, common objec-
tions to the contrary notwithstanding (for quality in-depth discussions see 
Nussbaum, 1992, Archer, 2000, Callinicos, 2004: 139–151, Sayer, 2011, 
Durkin, 2014 and Geras, 2016 [1983]). If it is accepted that there exists a 
common human nature, at least in the minimalist sense of humans not be-
ing infinitely plastic and malleable, i.e. of having certain unshakable needs 
simply in virtue of the kinds of biological bodies and brains they possess, 
we can infer from these at least a few objective human interests. It can 
scarcely be denied that people need, for example, sustenance, housing and 
basic health care if they are to survive, let alone live. Furthermore, it seems 
particularly insidious – in the midst of serious, multiple humanitarian crises 
across the globe – to claim people are wholly indifferent to things such as 
lack of housing, experiencing chronic pain, lack of personal autonomy, the 
denial of human dignity and so on. But if these fundamental human needs 
are admitted to exist, it follows logically that people have an interest, an 
objective interest, in their not being violated by various practices such as 
exploitation, domination, torture, mutilation, rape and violence in general. 
Assigning basic objective interests to persons need not be an exercise in 
philosophical naiveté, especially if two things are kept in mind. First, that 
what is universal and objective can have a whole multitude of concrete, 
culturally specific expressions which are not to be prejudged; second, that 
there exists a plethora of much less universally given human characteristics 
besides the universal ones. It only means rejecting the ungrounded anti-
humanist claim that people are nothing but a contingent cultural construct. 
As Geras (1995: 153) put it more generally:
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“It is not on account of any special forms of acculturation, historically 
particular social structures or types of learned behaviour, that people 
generally do not want to die of starvation or disease, or to lose their 
loved ones so, or to be cruelly humiliated, or to die or be permanently 
damaged physically or emotionally at the hands of a torturer, or to be 
persecuted for what they are or what they believe, be forcibly confined 
for it, be violently destroyed. These are just afflictions for members of 
our species in virtue of characteristics which we cross-culturally and 
more or less universally share”.
Enter Foucault: Radicalising power
What is usually counterpoised to the classical sociological concept of pow-
er which I have been discussing up to now, is the Foucauldian view. It 
derives from Foucault’s “genealogical” works of the early to mid–1970s. 
The Foucauldian concept of power is, so it is claimed, distinguished from 
the classical one by many features, the most important of which are listed 
below (see Foucault, 1980: 88–89, 96–98 and Foucault, 1978: 92–96):
(1) Power is not only repressive but, and especially, productive; agents 
are not subjugated by power, they are created by it;
(2) Power is not a thing, a commodity, a rare resource, an institution 
or a structure, but a social relation;
(3) Power is not something which could be possessed by individual 
agents and exercised by them over others;
(4) Power does not derive from one concentrated point in a society (for 
instance, the state or the economy); instead, it is uniquely dispersed;
(5) Power does not only encompass politics, it permeates everyday life;
(6) It cannot be judged whether an instance of power is unethical or 
not, although in some sense resistance to power is preferred.
With regards to this I will argue for two claims. First, that seemingly 
radical differences between the classical and the Foucauldian conceptions 
of power are, at least in certain respects, less radical and less real than it 
is thought. Second, that on those counts where the two concepts do, in 
fact, drastically differ; it is actually the classical concept that is more soci-
ologically convincing and useful despite the longstanding popularity of the 
Foucauldian view.
Let us begin with the first claim. What has to be noted from the outset 
is that point (1) from the list above, if interpreted in a suitably moderate 
way, along with points (2), (4) and (5), is wholly consistent with the cla-
ssical view of power. Power, based on the classical view, is definitely not 
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solely negative and repressive; it positively contributes to the makeup and 
shaping of subjects via many social processes, the most notable being pri-
mary and secondary socialisation. What is more, power is also productive in 
the sense that it enables those who possess it to act much more freely. So, 
power constrains and enables, it represses and produces. Relatedly, power 
not only forbids but also commands. Feudal lords did not only forbid their 
dependent tenants from fleeing to the cities. They also commanded them to 
use their (i.e. the lords’) mill for milling wheat or oven for baking bread. 
Furthermore, it is very true, as the Foucauldian view suggests, that power 
is not a synonym for commodities, institutions or tangible things in general. 
Instead, power usually denotes a social relation among persons or groups, 
and some of the consequent capacities of persons and groups.2 Power rarely 
exists without being based on and emerging out of institutions such as the 
state, or commodities and things such as weapons, money, precious stones, 
oil, etc., but it is not identical with these institutions and commodities. It is 
also true to say that power does not flow from one single place in a society, 
as it is correct to view power as occurring in spheres other than politics or 
the economy. Power, at least in the form of non-dominating power – but, 
regrettably and to a lesser extent, also as domination – is present in almost 
every aspect of human lives, from families, relations of friendship and lo-
ve, not to mention schools, workplaces, the streets, demonstrations and, of 
course, wars.
Much is made of this last point, i.e. the infamous Foucauldian emphasis 
on the ubiquity of power (Foucault, 1978: 93), as if it was a grand insight 
that is (unfairly) missed by most analyses of power. In fact, there is nothing 
unique or special about it. Although it is true that there are many different 
ways of interpreting the thesis that power is everywhere, some of which are 
definitely not compatible with the classical notion, the most sensible one 
(whatever its exegetical status) is almost trivial. Power is ubiquitous simply 
because power is, as per the classical definition, essentially a capability of 
individuals to affect each other’s actions and is, therefore, either latently or 
actually present wherever there are relations among people. In this rather 
unspectacular sense, at least, power really is inescapable.
2 I disagree, therefore, with Foucault that power cannot be a structure if by a structure we 
mean a relatively enduring social relation among people, for example feudal or capitalist 
social–property relations. The structural relations between exploiting feudal lords and their 
exploited serfs or the structural relations among competing capitalist entrepreneurs are a 
kind – an important kind – of power.
Tibor Rutar: Clarifying Power, Domination, and Exploitation: Between..., Revija za sociologiju 47 (2017), 2: 151–175
160
All these Foucauldian observations do not in the slightest contradict the 
classical conception of power and are, instead, central to it. Only points (3) 
and (6) are at odds with it. But these two points are arguably the weakest 
part of the Foucauldian concept of power and should therefore be rejected. 
Take point (3) first, the claim that power is not something that can be 
possessed and wielded by individual agents over other agents. As Akram, 
Emerson and Marsh (2015: 355), drawing on Foucault and Hayward, re-
cently put it: “Power is not an instrument that agents use to prevent the 
powerless from acting freely”. However, what else but the possession and 
wielding of power are going on when power is present and exercised, as in 
the paradigm cases of an employer exploiting a worker, a rapist subjugat-
ing a victim, a police officer beating a peaceful protester, a state official 
cancelling poor-relief, a gang intimidating a group of refugees? It is absurd 
to deny that one of the fundamental aspects of power is the fact that it can 
be possessed and wielded by individual agents.
Some might nonetheless object to my notion of power being possessed 
and wielded by people, as it seems to reify power, transform it into a thing 
or thing-like entity. This appearance is deceiving. This is so because I agree 
that power is a relation, not an entity, and relations cannot be possessed or 
wielded. However, I claim it is still useful to conceptualise power in these 
terms – even though we have to recognise that the terms of possession and 
wielding are just metaphors – because we lack better ones. So, to make 
my point here more precise and less metaphorical let me add two notes. 
First, a power relation is not a subject and therefore cannot itself act. Only 
people can act and, more importantly for my case here, they can act on 
the basis of a power relation in which they are embedded. In other words, 
power as a relation affords human subjects to act in a certain (i.e. powerful 
or powerless) way and in this sense people can possess power or lack it. 
An employer possesses the power to harass or fire his/her workers, while 
a worker who is harassed by his/her employer (usually) lacks the power 
to stop the employer’s action, especially if he/she cannot afford to lose the 
job. Second, and as already pointed out above, power relations are based 
on, and emerge out of, the distributions of various resources which can 
definitely be possessed and wielded in more than just a metaphorical sense.
As far as point (6) is concerned it is true that not all power is neces-
sarily illegitimate. However, can we really insist on that when it comes to 
domination? On this point Foucauldians surprisingly strike a position that 
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is remarkably close to positivist social science, at least in one respect. As 
Coole and Frost (2010: 36) have recently pointed out, even Foucault himself 
insisted “on his own nonnormative positivism”. Sayer (2012: 190) explained:
“For positivists, facts and values are different and incommensurable. 
[...] Given this, they argue that normative statements (oughts), about 
what is good or bad should therefore be avoided: ‘no ought from is’ is 
the slogan. [...] Foucault was a post-positivist but he also attempted to 
avoid normative evaluation. Some critics have claimed that his work 
is ‘crypto-normative’, to use Habermas’ term; that is, while it provides 
description of power and its ubiquity in the social world that is bound 
to seem ominous and vaguely dystopian to the reader, he studiously 
refrains from passing judgement on whether the power is good or bad”. 
(See also Philip, 1985: 79; Federici, 2004: 15.)
Now, this does not mean that Foucault and the Foucaldians are posi-
tivists, but it is true that they accept the incommensurability of facts and 
values usually associated with positivism.3 This conundrum can be resolved 
by recognising that although there is a gap between facts and values pre-
venting us from logically deducing values from facts, this gap can be, pace 
Hume, Weber, the positivists and Foucault, bridged. In our case it can be 
bridged by asking under what circumstances do human beings suffer and 
live impoverished lives? The answer clearly has to do, in the first instance, 
with how their fundamental human needs are being denied, and this is a 
matter of objective factual analysis, not speculation. It is true that there can 
be no factual justification for the starting ethical premise – that is, that hu-
man suffering should be avoided while flourishing and the good life are to 
be promoted – but if we decide to take on board this (reasonable) premise 
we can bring the facts in to the very next step. There are right and wrong 
answers, that is to say, objective, factual, scientific answers, to the question 
of what constitutes human flourishing as opposed to suffering. This ethical 
procedure in which values and facts become entangled is usually termed 
either “qualified” (Sayer, 2005: 212–224) or “weak” (Elder-Vass, 2010a) 
ethical naturalism and there is nothing naïve about it.
3 I do not invoke positivism here as an ill-defined swearword, so let me be more concrete 
about it. I identify positivist social science with any body of work which, explicitly or 
implicitly following the empiricist or logical positivist tradition, (i) denies the connection 
between facts and values, (ii) characterises causality in a non-realist, Humean way, i.e. as 
simply the “constant conjunction” of events instead of referring to the often unobservable 
causal mechanisms which sometimes produce regular events, but most often do not, and 
(iii) accordingly seeks to explain social phenomena along the lines of Carl Hempel’s cover-
ing law or deductive-nomological model (Hempel, 1965).
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It might be countered that Weber was nonetheless right to insist on 
scientists needing to be value-neutral with respect to their research in the 
sense that evidence should not be ignored (or inflated) so as to justify 
one’s preconceived values or political stances. This is most definitely the 
case. But with this claim Weber implicitly undermined his original claim 
that there is an unbridgeable gap between facts and values. If scientists can 
recognise which facts (evidence) conflict with their values and so, in cases 
where they succumb to dogmatism, reject or inflate them, this is possible 
precisely because there is a connection between facts and values. If facts 
and values were truly and completely separate matters no scientist could 
ever be led astray by value-considerations in his/her process of scientific 
research. But, in reality values depend on facts for their validity and are 
also contradicted by them which means that impetuous scientists can be 
misled by their value-commitments. It is exactly this that shows the gap 
separating facts and values not to be as wide and unbridgeable as Weber 
and the positivists are wont to say.
Now, if points (3) and (6) should be rejected, so should a radical inter-
pretation of point (1). According to this version of point (1), which Lukes 
(2005 [1974]: 12) calls “ultra-radical”, power not only contributes to the 
overall makeup of subjects but determines subjects all the way down so 
that subjects are nothing but “relays” of power, the “conduits” through 
which power exerts itself. This is the claim which is articulated most clear-
ly in Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1995 [1975]), in the first volume of 
The History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1978) and in Foucault’s famous “Two 
Lectures” (Foucault, 1980), and for which the Foucauldian concept is most 
celebrated. There are two main and related parts to Foucault’s radical no-
tion of power and subjectivity which should be noted.
First and most importantly, any kind of independence or autonomy is 
emphatically denied to subjectivity.4 The subject “is not the vis-à-vis of 
power” and is, instead, “one of its prime effects” so that the individual 
4 It is usually claimed in defence of the Foucauldian view on this point that it “does not 
eliminate the subject, or a concern with agency. [...] Foucault’s focus is on the very con-
struction of the subject” (Akram, Emerson and Marsh, 2015: 355). It is true that Foucault is 
concerned with the construction of subjectivity and that in this sense he does not eliminate 
it. But this is not what is at stake. My charge is that for Foucault subjectivity is nothing 
but what power makes of it; subjectivity is not relatively autonomous, agential. As Akram, 
Emerson and Marsh put it: power is “the rules which govern the various social practices 
that produce subjects and their preferences” (Akram, Emerson and Marsh, 2015: 355). The 
subject is a ruse of power, completely determined by it.
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“which power has constituted” is merely “the element of its articulation 
[...], its vehicle” (Foucault, 1980: 98). As Weberman (2000: 260), a scholar 
very sympathetic to Foucault, put it: “According to the relay model, the 
conscious subject is a ‘relay point’ or ‘conduit’ (my terms) or ‘vehicle’ or 
‘empty synthesis’ (Foucault’s terms) where anterior forces converge and 
combine to yield some behavioural output”. Society – i.e. power – com-
pletely determines the thoughts and actions of individual subjects (see also 
Sharpe and Boucher, 2010).
Secondly, for Foucault there is no such thing as human nature, no 
universal and relatively unchanging needs or capacities possessed by the 
subject. Not only are human beings not partly autonomous agents with their 
own intentions, reasons and conscious choices, but even human bodies are 
mere blank slates awaiting the inscription of history. The task of genealogi-
cal analysis is, as he famously said, “to expose the body totally imprinted 
by history and the processes of history’s destruction of the body” (Foucault, 
1984: 83; see, on this, Rehmann, 2013: 218–219). Even Stuart Hall (1996: 
11), who was wary of Foucault’s radical “theorisation of the subject” and 
power – going so far as to call it, pejoratively, “a very Durkheimean [sic] 
concept of power [...] [which] leads to an equally generalised Durkheimean 
concept of social control” (Hall, 1988: 52) – happily agreed that according 
the Foucauldian view “the body becomes infinitely malleable and contin-
gent” (Hall, 1996: 11; emphasis added).
The main problem with all this is that Foucault’s account of the subject 
and its body is, in a sense, Durkheimian, as Hall notes. More specifically, 
it is methodologically holist, i.e. socially determinist, in the double sense 
that what people do (subjectivity) and what characteristics people possess 
(human nature) is wholly determined from the outside. In fact, one strug-
gles at times to see what the big (methodological) difference is between the 
long-defunct Parsonian structural-functionalism and Foucauldian genealogy. 
As Mouzelis (2008: 241) commented:
“If instead of ‘subjectless practices’ one posits subjectless social pro-
cesses, instead of ‘objectives’, system requirements, and instead of 
the ‘construction of subjectivities’, socialisation, the methodological 
similarities between Foucault and Parsons become quite striking. Both 
underemphasise agency, and as a result both have to resort to teleologi-
cally oriented functionalist explanations”.
At this point it might be objected that any critique of the genealogi-
cal Foucauldian view of power as holist misses the fundamental fact that 
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Foucault himself was a nominalist. Indeed, Thomas Flynn (1989) countered 
that not only was Foucault not a methodological holist, but that his stance 
is actually, owing to his nominalist commitments, the very opposite – an 
individualist one. He explained:
 “What Foucault calls his ‘nominalism’ is per force of a kind of meth-
odological individualism. It treats collectivities such as the State or 
abstractions like ‘man’ or ‘power’ as reducible, for purposes of expla-
nation, to the individuals that comprise them. [...] These are standard 
claims of nominalism as commonly understood” (Flynn 1989: 134–
135).
Foucault (1978: 93) was himself quite explicit about his nominalism: 
“One needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and 
not a structure, neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is 
the name one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular 
society”. So how can I maintain that the Foucauldian view of power and 
subjectivity is holist when, in fact, for Foucault there is no monolithic 
power, institution or structure which would determine subjectivity in a Dur-
kheimian, top–down fashion? There are at least two points that can and 
need to be raised in response.
First, it is true that, being a nominalist, Foucault does imply that power 
is simply a name, not a real entity (or, as I would have it, a relation among 
people). If that is all there is to it, Flynn is right and Foucault cannot be a 
holist since for him power was not a supra-individual force capable of in-
fluencing individuals. In fact, power on this view seems not to exist at all, 
either as a supra-individual entity or anything else for that matter. Power 
is simply a name. However, this cannot be. The strict nominalist position 
is unsustainable even from Foucault’s own perspective because why study 
power if it does not actually exist (at least not as something more than a 
name)? Furthermore, the term “power” might simply be a name, but it is a 
name that refers to, according to Foucault (1978: 93) himself, “a complex 
strategical situation in a particular society”. So, it turns out that power – or, 
rather, that to which the term power points – does exist. But how does it 
operate? What is its relation to individual subjects?
Here I come to the second point. Foucault can deny power being an in-
stitution or a structure and thereby circumvent, on the face of it, my claim 
of him being a methodological holist. But my charge is more general than 
this and is thus compatible with Foucault’s denial of power being a totalis-
tic structure that defines everything. What I find holist in the Foucauldian 
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view is the thesis that what individuals do is wholly determined by extra-
individual forces. What might these forces be if not institutions and struc-
tures? Flynn (1989: 135) called them practices, “socially sanctioned body 
of rules that govern one’s manner of perceiving, judging, imagining and 
acting”. So, it’s not monolithic institutions, Durkheimian “social facts” and 
structures that determine the subjectivity of an agent. It is social “practices” 
that do so. Well, this is exactly what I find objectionable and what I call 
methodological holism, although I have no particular attachment to this 
exact term. It therefore seems to me that far from nominalism and holism 
contradicting each other, they are actually quite compatible. Flynn himself 
revealed as much when he went on to say that the characteristic move “of 
a historical nominalist” is the:
“[e]vacuation of the creative subject from significant historical agency. 
[...] The most profoundly nominalistic aspect of his project is perhaps 
this distillation of the subject into the point of intersection of various 
practices. [...] Foucault has reduced the linguistic subject to a place-
holder in a shifting series of practices” (Flynn, 1989: 140–141).
Whatever we call this thesis – holism, anti-humanism, etc., the Fou-
cauldian view that individual subjects are not relatively autonomous agents 
who carry out practices, but are instead themselves carried out by practices, 
defined as a “socially sanctioned body of rules”, is deeply problematic. It 
is so because the single biggest flaw of methodological holism, most evi-
dently on display in Parsonian sociology but also in Althusserian Marxism, 
is that it cannot explain the omnipresent empirical fact of human resistance 
to power, subjugation, socialisation, etc.5 This is all the more problematic 
for Foucault who constantly referred to resistance and stated that wherever 
there is power there is resistance to it. How can this be if subjects are mere 
“relays” or “vehicles” of power? As Harpham (2006: 3) commented:
“This emphasis on the ways in which the self is shaped, formed, cor-
rected, normalised, and documented by agencies and structures beyond 
its knowledge or control made it difficult to imagine how such a thing 
as a self-aware or self-determining individual might arise within the 
ʻregime’ of modernity, with its proliferating sites of control”.
5 One of the first critics to point this dilemma out in relation to Foucault was probably 
Nicos Poulantzas (Poulantzas, 2000 [1978]; Jessop, 2004). I should also mention here that 
Poulantzas has rightly argued against the Foucauldian view for reducing power to its ex-
ercise and for downplaying the continued significance of repression in modern societies. 
It is one thing to emphasise that power is not only repressive, and a very different and 
incorrect thing to imply that power has nothing or almost nothing to do with repression.
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The problem is even more acute than that. Not only is it that on Fou-
cault’s radical account of subjectivity it is hard to imagine how a subject 
capable of resisting could emerge, but we can also ask why such a subject, 
if he/she were somehow to emerge, would want to struggle? If the subject’s 
body is a blank slate, completely formed by power, it will not in any way 
collide with the functioning of power. As Lena Gunnarsson (2013: 12) put 
it in a different context:
“We cannot make sense of from where socially constructed power 
structures derive their oppressively constraining effect on people with-
out a notion of constraints that are not socially constructed [i.e. are a 
part of human nature], such as the need for recognition that underpins 
our vulnerability to other people’s views”.
No needs or interests will clash with the exercise of power since all of 
the subject’s needs and interests are completely created by power itself; to 
say otherwise is to admit that human bodies are not “totally imprinted by 
history” and “infinitely malleable”. But if there is no conflict of interests 
in the exercise of power there is also no reason for resisting it.
It is, therefore, not surprising that Foucault himself later moved away 
from this “ultra-radical” concept of subjectivity. If in his genealogical pe-
riod the individual “is not the vis-à-vis of power” and is, instead, “one of 
its prime effects” (Foucault, 1980: 98), this position was reversed in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, just before his death. He noted that when he 
“was studying asylums, prisons, and so on” he insisted “too much on the 
techniques of domination” (Foucault, 1993: 203–204). He went on:
“But, analysing the experience of sexuality, I became more and more 
aware that there is in all societies, I think, in all societies whatever 
they are, another type of techniques: techniques which permit individu-
als to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on 
their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, 
modify themselves. [...] Let’s call this kind of techniques a techniques 
of technology of the self” (Foucault, 1993: 203; emphasis added).
It seems that the later Foucault endowed subjects with a great deal 
of autonomy and even allowed room for something like a minimal human 
nature. With this he opened himself up to the possibility of a different no-
tion of power. Earlier he denied, consistent with his anti-humanist stance, 
any autonomy to the subject and so refused the classical concept of power. 
Power could not be conceptualised as something possessed and exercised 
by subjects over other subjects. Quite the reverse, subjects themselves were 
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seen as being possessed and exercised by power. But later, moving away 
from the “ultra-radical” notion of subjectivity, Foucault (1983: 217) said 
something very different about power: “Let us not deceive ourselves: if we 
speak of the structures or the mechanisms of power, it is only insofar as we 
suppose that certain persons exercise power over others”. So, for him the 
term ʻpower’ designates relationships between partners [...], an ensemble 
of actions which induce others and follow from one another [...], a mode 
of action upon the actions of others” (Foucault, 1983: 217, 221). No long-
er were subjects seen as mere effects of power, “docile bodies”. Instead, 
power “is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are 
free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with 
a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions 
and diverse comportments may be realised” (Foucault, 1983: 221). As he 
put it in an interview of 1980 in more detail:
“What does it mean to exercise power? It does not mean picking up 
this tape recorder and throwing it on the ground. I have the capacity to 
do so – materially, physically, sportively. But I would not be exercising 
power if I did that. However, if I take this tape recorder and throw it 
on the ground in order to make you mad, or so that you can’t repeat 
what I’ve said, or to put pressure on you so that you’ll behave in such 
and such way, or to intimidate you – well, what I’ve done, by shap-
ing your behaviour through certain means, that is power” (Foucault, 
1988: 2).
This conceptualisation is much more like the classical sociological no-
tion of power (and domination), and if my preceding arguments hold Fou-
cault was right to accept it.
The differences between domination and exploitation
With the definitions of power and domination in place we can now turn 
to the oft-used but rarely clearly or at least usefully defined concept of 
exploitation. It was noted above that domination is a subset of power, so 
domination is simply one form of power. Now I want to add that exploita-
tion is itself a subset of domination, i.e. exploitation is a particular form of 
domination. More specifically, exploitation is just that form of domination 
which involves – besides the usual undermining of objective interests and 
either personal or impersonal force which are characteristic of domination 
– the extraction of unpaid surplus labour from the targeted agents. These 
three elements are, then, the key elements of exploitation: (a) the undermin-
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ing of agent’s objective interests, (b) personal or impersonal force, and (c) 
the unremunerated extraction of surplus from the agent. Together they pro-
vide sufficient conditions for exploitation (on this see also Reiman, 1987; 
cf. Kymlicka, 2002: 177–190 and Vrousalis, 2013).
Such a definition is more nuanced than the classic Marxist concept of 
exploitation. According to the classic Marxist definition, exploitation occurs 
wherever unpaid surplus labour is extracted from immediate producers, re-
gardless of the presence of force and how this extraction process impacts 
the interests of those involved. Therborn, for example, explicitly rejected 
the category of (objective) interests because it ostensibly rests on “unwar-
ranted and untenable assumptions” (Therborn, 1980: 5). He went on to 
define exploitation very broadly:
“The concept of ‘exploitation’ in historical materialism refers simply to 
the separate appropriation of surplus labour; in other words, to the fact 
that one category of economic agents works more than is necessary for 
their own reproduction and that the fruits of their surplus labour are 
appropriated by another”.
There is a good reason for rejecting this broad and otherwise virtu-
ally ubiquitous Marxist concept of exploitation. This is so because, as 
mentioned in the introduction to the article, it generates false positives. It 
categorises as exploitation those phenomena which are under no reason-
able stretch of imagination actually exploitation, as happens in the case 
of handicapped people who receive welfare benefits which are extracted 
without remuneration from workers through taxes. The definition I offered 
avoids this problem. To give more examples: according to my definition, 
the mere act of giving gifts need not be exploitative, yet on the classic 
Marxist view it has to be. It is, of course, true that the act of giving a 
gift involves the transfer of unpaid surplus labour and its appropriation by 
the agent who receives the gift. But this is not necessarily exploitation. It 
becomes exploitation only when the gift-giver is forced, either personally 
or impersonally, to offer gifts and when the act of giving nontrivially hurts 
his/her objective interest in material wellbeing, autonomy, etc. Similarly, 
when a poker player loses a large sum of money, this situation need not 
be viewed as exploitative even though an appropriation of unpaid surplus 
labour (in the form of money) has occurred; it might also be that, if the 
sum is high enough, the loser’s objective interests are greatly diminished. 
But as long as the play was not a result of impersonal or personal coercion, 
it is not reasonable to call it exploitation.
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It was said above that exploitation is not synonymous with domination 
but is a particular form of domination. What distinguishes exploitation from 
domination (as opposed to mere power) is precisely Therborn’s “appropria-
tion of surplus labour”. So, on the one hand, the relations between a slave 
and a slaveowner, a serf and a landlord or a worker and a capitalist are all 
relations of exploitation. On the other hand, the relation between society’s 
prevailing religious group and the minority religious group, wherein the 
first, for example, fundamentally restricts the democratic rights of the latter, 
or the relation between Early Modern European colonisers of North Ameri-
can and its indigenous population, are both relations of domination (the 
last example is from Wright, 1995). The sociological implications of these 
two different forms of power – exploitation and domination – are not the 
same. Exploited agents have a much better bargaining position than those 
who are dominated. The exploited possess an important amount of potential 
power in relation to their exploiters. This is so because, as Erik Olin Wright 
(1995) put it, the exploiters need their exploited subjects – they are depend-
ent on them for their own material benefit – while the dominators do not 
care about their dominated subjects. A capitalist who loses his or her work-
ers, or a feudal lord who loses serfs, cannot generate income which she or 
he otherwise gets from them. This is of a serious concern to the exploiter 
which means that their own interests compel them never to completely ig-
nore the pleadings and pressures of their exploited subjects. It is not only 
the fact that they do not want to lose their subordinates that compels them 
not to completely ignore the subordinates’ requests. It is also, and more 
importantly for sociological analysis, that when subordinates exert pressure 
over them, they immediately feel that pressure on their own pocketbook.
In contrast, the prevailing religious group which dominates the minor-
ity does not care at all if the latter vanishes, as the European colonisers 
of North America did not care about what happened with the indigenous 
population. In fact, dominators usually want the dominated to be gone. 
This is the main difference between relations of domination and relations 
of exploitation. As Wright (1995: 92) noted:
“Genocide is thus always a potential strategy for nonexploitative op-
pressors. It is not an option in a situation of economic exploitation 
because exploiters require the labour of the exploited for their material 
well-being. It is no accident that culturally we have the saying, ‘the 
only good Indian is a dead Indian’, but not the saying ‘the only good 
worker is a dead worker.’ The contrast between South Africa and North 
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America in their treatment of indigenous peoples reflects this differ-
ence poignantly: in North America, where the indigenous peoples were 
oppressed (by virtue of being coercively displaced from the land) but 
not exploited, genocide was the basic policy of social control in the 
face of resistance; in South Africa, where the European settler popula-
tion heavily depended upon African labour for its own prosperity, this 
was not an option”.
From this it follows, as was said, that the dominated have a much 
weaker bargaining position in relation to their dominators than do the ex-
ploited in relation to their exploiters. An important consequence of this 
fact is that when the dominated struggle against their dominators they can 
be successful in their struggle only if they manage to find a way to make 
themselves felt by the dominators, to make them care, to make the domi-
nators’ ignorance of the dominated costly. As the struggle for democratic 
rights reveals (Therborn, 1977; Tilly, 1978; Fox Piven and Cloward, 1979), 
the dominated have always been aware of this and have usually realised 
their demands by building on the latent power of the exploited, usually in 
the form of strikes, sit-downs and other collective actions which can be 
immensely costly to the exploiters (as well as those dominators who are 
indirectly dependent on the exploiters’ power and revenue) and thus make 
them sensitive to the demands of the movement.
Conclusion
The popular Foucauldian view of power which, in contrast to the classical 
sociological one, construes power as that which creates subjects instead 
of subjects being those who use power is at least doubly unsatisfactory. It 
succumbs to methodological holism according to which subjectivity is a 
mere ruse of power retaining no causal autonomy, and it renews the myth 
of facts and values being separated by an unbridgeable chasm thus banish-
ing the normative dimension outside the purview of social science. This 
myth and the consequent value-neutrality of social sciences create another 
problem for the Foucauldian concept of power: they make it unable of dif-
ferentiating between power and domination.6
6 A limitation of my study is that it does not discuss the literature of “applied” genealogi-
cal insights which emerged after Foucault’s death. There are case studies, for example Su-
san Bordo’s (2004), Clarissa Hayward’s (2000), Bent Flyvbjerg’s (1998 [1991]) and similar, 
that strive to show, empirically, how useful the more radical Foucauldian notions of power 
and subjectivity are. A fine review of some of this literature is provided by Lukes (2005 
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In fact, as we have seen, there are subtle but important ontological 
and analytical differences between the categories of power, domination and 
exploitation. Power is most usefully and convincingly conceptualised as 
a capacity (whether exercised or not) of an agent or a group of agents 
to influence other agents in such a way that the latter do something they 
otherwise would not have done, or not do something they otherwise would 
have done. The levers of power are either personal, impersonal or both: 
they can refer to the structural positions of agents, the resources and rights 
they possess or have access to, sheer physical force, intimidation, agenda-
setting, status, offers of awards and benefits etc. Foucault himself recog-
nised the usefulness of this concept of power, at least to an extent, after 
his “genealogical” phase. When power is negative, i.e. when it hurts the 
objective interests of the targeted agents, in a nontrivial manner, it becomes 
domination. Such domination becomes exploitation if it involves unpaid 
transfer and appropriation of surplus labour of the dominated.
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Objašnjenje moći, dominacije i eksploatacije: između 
„klasičnog” i „fukoovskog” poimanja moći
Tibor RUTAR
Odsjek za sociologiju, Filozofski fakultet, Sveučilište u Mariboru, Slovenija
tibor.rutar@um.si
U radu se istražuju dva sveprisutna poimanja moći: „klasično sociološko”, koje 
se oslanja na definiciju moći Maxa Webera, i „fukoovsko”, koje proizlazi iz ge-
nealoških radova Michela Foucaulta. Zagovaraju se tri glavne teze. Prvo, ta dva 
koncepta u većini aspekata nisu onoliko drastično različita koliko se to najčešće 
tvrdi. Dokazuje se da u okviru obaju koncepata postoji prostor za različite izvo-
re moći, za tumačenje moći bez opredmećivanja, za činjenicu da je moć rijetko 
potpuno centralizirana i slično. Drugo, u onim aspektima u kojima se ta dva 
koncepta doista razlikuju, klasično je poimanje moći uvjerljivije i korisnije nego 
Foucaultovo. Dokazuje se da je fukoovsko gledište implicitno pozitivističko u 
normativnom aspektu pa je stoga u okviru toga gledišta nemoguće razlikovati 
moć i dominaciju, kao i to da ono podliježe pogreškama metodološkog holizma 
(odnosno, nedovoljno razmatra djelovanje). Treće, tvrdi se da klasično sociološ-
ko gledište omogućuje analitičko razlikovanje moći, dominacije i eksploatacije. 
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Dokazuje se da te tri kategorije nemaju jednako značenje te da svaka od njih 
podrazumijeva znatno različite sociološke implikacije. Pokazuje se da se eksplo-
atacija ne odnosi na bilo koji proces neplaćenog prisvajanja viška s obzirom na 
to da se prihvaćanjem te definicije očito izvode lažni zaključci. Ipak, takvo je 
prisvajanje temeljna karakteristika prema kojoj se eksploatacija razlikuje od do-
minacije (ali ne i moći), a to otkriva važnu sociološku implikaciju za dinamiku 
borbe eksploatiranih protiv eksploatacije, različitu od borbe dominiranih nad vr-
šiteljima dominacije.
Ključne riječi: moć, dominacija, eksploatacija, Foucault, vrijednosna neutralnost
